New limits for the New Year by Frederick T. Furlong
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
December 28, 1984
New limits For The N.ew Year
The New Year will bring yet one more chapter in
the ongoing saga ofdeposit interest rate deregula-
tion. OnJanuary 1, 1985, theregulatory minimum
balances on money market deposit accounts,
Super-NOW accounts and 7- to 31-day ceiling-
free time accounts will decline to $1,000 from
$2,500. Onlyone year later, in 1986, all size
limitations on these accounts will be removed.
The loweringofthe regulatory minimumsforthese
accounts harbors the potential for inducing shifts
among financial assets that could distort the mon-
etary aggregates, particularlyM1 and M2. Deposi-
tOrs mightchoose, forexample, to movefunds
from regular savings deposit accounts, not in-
cluded in M1, to Super-NOWs, included in M1,
which require lower balances. Such transfers
would temporarily boost M1 growth and thereby
make it moredifficultto interpretthebehaviorof
that aggregate. (There also is the question, not
addressed directly in this Letter, ofwhetherthe
greaterflexibility afforded depository institutions
to pay explicit intereston liquid accounts could
affect the behaviorofthe monetary aggregates on
a more lasting basis.)
Central to whetherthe potential for the upcoming
regulatory changes to affectthe monetary aggre-
gates is ofany practical importance is the vigor
with which depository institutions promotethe
smalleraccounts. Alsoofcrucial importance is the
degree to which existing regulatory size limita-
tions have been binding constraints. This Weekly
Letter looks at howcommercial banks and thrifts
are approaching the upcoming regulatory
changes and whetherthe $2,500 limithas signifi-
cantlydeterred the shiftingoffunds toderegulated
accounts. This Letter ends with adiscussion of
some factors that mightbe contributingto the
continued survival offixed-ceiling accounts.
Background
In late 1982 and early 1983, commercial banks
andthriftinstitutionsembraced the introductionof
two new deregulated accounts-MoneyMarket
Deposit Accounts (MMDAs) and Super-NOWs-
with great zeal. They competed aggressively for
funds by offeringextremely attractive interest
rates, particularly on the MMDA. The period of
intense competition forthe deregulated accounts,
however, was relatively short-lived. For example,
the average rate on MMDAs at commercial banks
was above rates on short-term Treasury securities
onlythrough April 1983. From April 1983 toOcto-
berofthis year, the average return on MMDAs
remained below short-term Treasury rates. More-
over, following the initial surge, interest rates on
the liquidderegulated accounts havetended to lag
behind movements in open marketrates. As Chart
1 suggests, de'pository institutions tended to allow
the gap between the rates on short-term nonde-
posit instruments and the rates on MMDAs, and
especially Super-NOWs, to widen considerably
as interest rates rose in 1984. In the latter part of
1984, interest rates on MMDAs and Super-NOWs
also lagged behindthe sharp decline in open mar-
ket rates.
The observation that rates on MMDAs generally
are below open market rates should not be sur-
prising given the high costofattracting and main-
taining retail-type deposits. The increase in the
gap between deposit and market rates when open
market rates rise probably reflects some reluc-
tance on thepartofinvestors to incurthecosts and
inconvenience oftransferring funds. When open
market rates decline, depository institutions are
slow to adjust their deposit rates downward prob-
ablyoutofthe concern thatthey would jeopardize
relationships with depositors that are costly to
re-establish.
Proceeding with caution
Whatever factors are determiningthe pricingof
MMDAs and Super-NOWs, it is unlikelythatthe
change in minimum size will do much to alterthe
competitive environmentforcommercial banks
and thrifts. Depository institutions in general are
not going to take bold marketing steps, such as
enticing depositors toopen small deregulated ac-
counts by offering relatively high promotional
rates. On thecontrary, mostdepository institutions
are approachingthe loweringofthe minimum
average balances very cautiously.
The caution on the part ofbanks and thrifts is
reflected in the results ofa survey conducted by
Trans Data Corporation (a private survey firm).FRBSF
That survey found that in the third quarterofthis
year, abouthalfofthe sampled institutions had not
made final plans on whetherto lowerthe size
limits on either MMDAs orSuper-NOWs. The
same survey found thatonly one-third ofthe sam-
pled institutions had definite plans to lowerthe
limits. Moreover, forinstitutionsthatplan to lower
the!imits;feesand thetieringofinterestrates; or
perhaps some combination ofthe two, wiII hold
down yields on the smaller accounts.
Responses to more recent inquiries ofwestern
depository institutions bythe staffofthe Federal
Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco reinforce the find-
ings ofTrans DataCorporation. Some commercial
banks and thriftinstitutions havedecidedto lower
the minimum average sizes on both MMDAsand
Super-NOWs, whileothers will reduce the size
limitfor onlyone ofthe accounts. Many deposi-
tory institutions, however, are claiming a "wait-
and-see" attitude.
Sizing it up
In the absence ofaggressive promotions by banks
and thrifts, the extent ofthe shifts and the sources
ofthe transfers to MMDAs and Super-NOWs will
probably be determined by the degree to which
the current limits represent meaningful barriers to
savers. This does notmean thatthe level ofpromo-
tion is independentofwhetherthe limits are bind-
ing. In fact, the lackofvigor on the partofdeposi-
tory institutions in pursuingthe imminent regula-
tory changes can be interpreted as an indication
that the $2,500 minimum balances forMMDAs
and Super-NOWs have not had much impacton
depositors' choices ofaccounts.
More directevidence also seems to support the
view that size limits have not been significant
barriers. Balances in Super-NOWs, forexample,
generallyare much higherthan thecurrent$2,500
minimums. Data available from the Trans Data
Corporation show that the median size of Super-
NOWs is an estimated $13,000.
After the introduction ofSuper-NOWs, the aver-
age size ofregular NOWaccount balances fell
about $700, indicatingthat large regular NOWs
had been an importantsource ofthe transfer of
funds among the components ofM1. However,
with the average balance in regular NOWsat
commercial banks still averaging close to $5000
-twicethecurrentminimumforSuper-NOWs-
it seems clearthatdepositors' allocations oftrans-
actions deposits between Super-NOWs and regu-
lar NOWs was influenced by factors otherthan
minimum deposit requirements.
Ifthe lower minimum average balances were to
boosttheamountofMl balancesthe publicwant-
ed to hold, the increase would most likely come
from the shifting of savings balances to Super-
NOWs. Such shifts, ofcourse, would be mitigated
by the simultaneous loweringofthe regulatory
size limitofMMDAs. Indeed, since interest rates
on smallersize personal MMDAscouId be expec-
ted to be higherthan those on comparable Super-
NOWs (because the former are not subject to
reserve requirements), itwould seem at least as
likely thatMl balances would be attracted to
MMDAs, and thereby depress M1. In fact, the
experience with the introduction ofthese deregu-
lated accounts some twoyears ago showed that
flows to Super-NOWs from outside M1 were
aboutoffset by shifts outofM1 to MMDAs.
Even withoutcompetition from MMDAs, smaller
size Super-NOWsmightnothave much impacton
savers' decisions. The $2,500 size limitmay be as
meaningless a deterrentto the shifting ofsavings
balances as it was to the shifting oftransactions
balances. Just priorto the introduction ofthe
Super-NOW and MMDA, the savings component
in the monetary aggregates stood at about $360
biIIion. Close to $310 biIIion ofthattotal repre-
sented fixed-ceiling savings deposits. It is esti-
mated, based on sample data, that approximately
80 percentofthese fixed-ceiling deposits were in
accountswith balances in excess of$2,500. Since
1982,fixe9-ceilingsavings deposits havefallen by
over $60 biIIion. Whileasizeabledrop, thepersis-
tence ofa considerable volumeofsavings balan-
ces in relatively large, fixed-ceiling accounts sug-
gests thattheregulatorysize Iimithas notbeen the
primary barrier preventingthe remaining savings
balances from shiftingto Super-NOWs, oreven
MMDAs for that mat):er.
The potential ofthe lowersize limitson thedereg-
ulated accounts for affecting M2 seems nonexis-
tent. When MMDAs were introduced, M2 was
distorted by flows from large time deposit ac-
counts ($100,000 or more), institution-only
money market mutual funds, and other market
instruments. However, these non-M2 outlets
shouId not be affected bythe loweringofthe
minimum size for MMDAs. Consequently, theClIs'l j
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lower minimum on the MMDAshould not attract
a measurable amountoffunds from outside M2.
Morethat meets the eye
Ifaccountsizehas notbeen asignificantbarrierto
the popularity of deposit accounts with market-
related rates ofreturn, howdoweexplain the
continued survival of $250 billion in savings, $80
billion in personal demand deposits, and $100
billion in other personal checking accounts ex-
cluding 5uper-NOWs, all ofwhich pay zero or
comparatively low fixed rates ofinterest? Some
might argue that lackofinformation or inertia
accounts forthe failure ofmore depositors to shift
funds toMMDAs and Super-NOWS. However,
the decision ofsome depositorsto remain in fixed-
ceiling accounts maybe based on other, more
tangible, reasons.
One likely reason forthe continued attractiveness
ofpersonal demand depositsand regular NOWs is
the impositionoffees on Super-NOWs. These fees
are usuallywaived only for larger accounts,
whereas fees on regular NOWsoften are waived
for even modest-sized accounts.
By remaining in fixed-ceilingaccounts, depositors
also may accomplish morethan merely avoid
fees. Take savings deposit accounts, forexample.
Overtheyears, as marketinterest rates have risen,
balances in savings deposits, ofcourse, have de-
clined. The balances that have remained, how-
ever, are different in nature from those that have
been shifted to other accounts. In particular, the
survivingsavings deposits are more active on av-
erage. Annual depositturnover rates for savings
deposits have increased from 1% to over 5 be-
tween 1977and 1984.Sincemoreactiveaccounts
are more expensiveto maintain, institutions have
moved to imposefees on smallersavings deposits.
While such fees could affecta large numberof
accounts, they have no impact on the vast major-
ityofdeposits because they generally are waived
for all but the smallest accounts. Consequently,
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holders ofthe bulkofsavings deposits have not
had to cover these higher costs. For these savers,
theoverall return-thatis, the combination
ofexplicit and implicit interest-has risen by
far more than that suggested by the fixed-rate
ceilings.
Chart 2 shows estimates ofthe implicit interest
(noninterestexpenses less fees as a percentof
savings deposits) for savings deposits based on
Functional CostAnalysis data.Whi1ean imperfect
proxyforthe implicitreturn on deposits, the data
prOVide some perspective on the gro.wing impor-
tance ofimplicit interest in the overall returns of
savingsdepositsatcommercial banks. As thechart
suggests, the combinedexplicit(passbookrate) and
implicit (noninterest expenses) return on savings
maybewhat makes such holdings sufficiently
attractive for some depositors. The attractiveness
ofimplicit interest for personal deposits is under-
standable, even in a deregulated environment,
because it is tax free.
Conclusion
On January 1, the regulatory minimum average
balances on MMDAs, Super-NOWs, and 7- to
31-day accounts will be set at $1,000. The lower
denomination accounts will be available to de-
positors, butthe extent oftheir appeal remains
uncertain. Mostdepository institutionsdonotplan
topromotethe smalleraccountsveryaggressively.
Moreover, itdoes notappear that the highersize
limits have been responsible forthe bulkofthe
funds remaining in fixed-ceilingdepositaccounts.
The evidenceon the effectofsize limits on where
depositors decide to placetheirfunds indicates
that the lowersize limits will notseriously distort
M1 orM2 in 1985 as awhole. To theextentthatthe
monetaryaggregates mightbe affected, pastexpe-
rienceindicatesthatthe impactwould beconcen-
trated in the first few months ofnext year.
Frederick T. Furlong
Opinions expressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily renect theviews of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
francisco, orof the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
E~itorial commentsmaybeaddressed to theeditor(Gregory Tong) orto the author....Freecopiesof Federal Reserve publications
can beobtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
94120. Phone (415) 974·2246.uo~6u!ysom yo~n U060JO 0POI\0U





BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 188,103 632 12,078 7.1
Loans and Leases1 6 169,529 695 14,174 9.4
Commercial and Industrial 53,111 300 7,148 16.1
Real estate 61,643 79 2,744 4.8
Loans to Individuals 31,416 204 4,765 18.5
Leases 5,079 4 16 0.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,524 - 81 - 983 - 8.1
OtherSecurities2 7,050 17 - 1,113 - 14.1
Total Deposits 192,358 -2,170 1;361 0.7
Demand Deposits 44,943 -2,024 - 4,294 - 9.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,434 -1,276 - 1,897 - 6.2
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,668 - 397 - 107 - 0.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,748 253 5,763 4.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 40,683 177 1,086 2.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 40,668 244 2,503 6.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,661 - 639 - 1,346 - 6.0
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities·
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephonetransfers
S Includes borrowing via FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change